The ongoing struggle with Russia could be classified as both a proxy war, with feet on the ground, and a financial war, with Russia already losing the financial war decisively. Russia's financial situation is in a state of catastrophic collapse, with less than 10 years of stability projected. President Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 bet everything on one card. If he conquered Ukraine, he would stop the country’s Westernization and absorb it into a new confederation with Belarus and the Russian Federation. However, with the failure of Russia’s military to take Kyiv scuttled this federation expending project, dashing any illusions of welding Ukraine into a common state organism with Russia and imperiling President Putin’s own legitimacy to rule in Moscow.
The situation has now devolved into a proxy war, with Ukraine vying for territory and Putin attempting to maintain a public image. The Russian state will enter a phase of slow decay. In this variant, nothing happens immediately. There will be no rapid military or political change as Russia’s empire simply enters the next phase of its disintegration. This became particularly evident during the recent mutiny of Wagner group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, which marked the first serious rebellion in President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle and one of many new developments in Russia’s internal situation that could acquire significance as stages in a long-term “disintegration” scenario.
The mutiny of Wagner group it exposed the weakness of the Russian president and the authoritarian system he built, revealing hidden fractures in the highest circle of power. In Russian history, waves of change have traditionally been triggered when people perceive the ruler as failing to lead or showing fear – thereby stripping him of his “holy” status. Mr Putin decided to rebuild a third Russian empire under his personal control, using the Soviet inheritance as a model. The polity he created evolved from an authoritarian into a semi-totalitarian state. In the ideological sense, it bundled elements of Tsarist Russian and Soviet tradition. Economically, it depended on exporting natural resources (mainly hydrocarbons) with income streams controlled by a political-military oligarchy largely composed of former members of the security services. That is completely over now. Mr. Putin’s third incarnation of the Russian empire rested on the political and economic domination of nations that had historically been exploited by Moscow. This was the message behind Russia’s military aggression against Georgia and Ukraine.
Turbulence ahead
An old hallmark of Soviet decline – technological backwardness – is also making a comeback. The reimposition of Western sanctions has revealed Russia’s dependence on the outside world and its inability to make do without imported Western technologies. Like the Soviet Union, Russia can make money from oil and gas but finds itself helpless to produce microprocessors. A growing sense of vulnerability creates friction in the ruling camp and encourages infighting among rival interest groups fearful for the empire’s future. Russia’s rulers’ traditional response to such tensions has traditionally been small wars on the imperial borderlands to show that autocratic control remains essential.
There might be efforts in certain areas to emancipate themselves from Kremlin oversight and function independently from the central government's authority, or at least with significantly more autonomy. Under these circumstances, there is a high probability that centrifugal and separatist inclinations may resurface. The South Caucasus is a very vulnerable region that has a substantial risk of falling apart.
The situation has now devolved into a proxy war, with Ukraine vying for territory and Putin attempting to maintain a public image. The Russian state will enter a phase of slow decay. In this variant, nothing happens immediately. There will be no rapid military or political change as Russia’s empire simply enters the next phase of its disintegration. This became particularly evident during the recent mutiny of Wagner group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, which marked the first serious rebellion in President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle and one of many new developments in Russia’s internal situation that could acquire significance as stages in a long-term “disintegration” scenario.
The mutiny of Wagner group it exposed the weakness of the Russian president and the authoritarian system he built, revealing hidden fractures in the highest circle of power. In Russian history, waves of change have traditionally been triggered when people perceive the ruler as failing to lead or showing fear – thereby stripping him of his “holy” status. Mr Putin decided to rebuild a third Russian empire under his personal control, using the Soviet inheritance as a model. The polity he created evolved from an authoritarian into a semi-totalitarian state. In the ideological sense, it bundled elements of Tsarist Russian and Soviet tradition. Economically, it depended on exporting natural resources (mainly hydrocarbons) with income streams controlled by a political-military oligarchy largely composed of former members of the security services. That is completely over now. Mr. Putin’s third incarnation of the Russian empire rested on the political and economic domination of nations that had historically been exploited by Moscow. This was the message behind Russia’s military aggression against Georgia and Ukraine.
Turbulence ahead
An old hallmark of Soviet decline – technological backwardness – is also making a comeback. The reimposition of Western sanctions has revealed Russia’s dependence on the outside world and its inability to make do without imported Western technologies. Like the Soviet Union, Russia can make money from oil and gas but finds itself helpless to produce microprocessors. A growing sense of vulnerability creates friction in the ruling camp and encourages infighting among rival interest groups fearful for the empire’s future. Russia’s rulers’ traditional response to such tensions has traditionally been small wars on the imperial borderlands to show that autocratic control remains essential.
There might be efforts in certain areas to emancipate themselves from Kremlin oversight and function independently from the central government's authority, or at least with significantly more autonomy. Under these circumstances, there is a high probability that centrifugal and separatist inclinations may resurface. The South Caucasus is a very vulnerable region that has a substantial risk of falling apart.
